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RESPONDING TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BRADLEY SCOTr SHANNON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Adam N. Steinman's recent article, The Irrepressible Myth
of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years
After the Trilogy,' makes a substantial contribution to an important area
of the law: the law of summary judgment.2 More specifically, Steinman
offers a provocative interpretation of what is arguably the most
significant summary judgment decision to date, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett'
According to Steinman, Celotex has been misinterpreted, resulting in
the imposition of a strict standard with respect to the admissibility of
factual materials presented by parties (particularly plaintiffs) responding
to motions for summary judgment.! Steinman argues that Celotex is best
interpreted as imposing only a minimal standard with respect to the
admissibility of such materials; in his view, the opposing (or adverse)
party's materials need only be "reducible" to admissible evidence In
this Essay, though, I will argue that both positions are incorrect, at least
in a sense. I will argue first that, as a matter of precedent, Celotex has
nothing to say about an adverse party's burden in response to a motion
for summary judgment. Thus, any reliance placed on that decision in
support of anyone's position on this issue is misplaced. Second, I will
argue that, regardless of the relevance (or irrelevance) of Celotex,
Steinman's position regarding an adverse party's burden in this context
cannot be correct. Rather, I will argue that Federal Rule of Civil
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. B.A., J.D., University of
Washington. I thank the Florida Coastal School of Law faculty for their many suggestions
regarding this Essay.
1. Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary
Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 81 (2006).
2. Indeed, Steinman himself demonstrates the importance of this subject through his
observation that the three most cited decisions in the federal courts, and the two most cited
decisions in all United States courts, are Supreme Court summary judgment decisions. See id.
at 86-88, 142-45.
3. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
4. Steinman, supra note 1, at 110.
5. Id. at 131.
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Procedure 56,6 the rule that governs summary judgment in the federal
district courts, is best interpreted as imposing a strict standard with
respect to the admissibility of materials presented by parties at summary
judgment, a standard that approximates a party's evidentiary burden at
trial. Though my interpretation might place an insuperable burden on
some-meaning summary judgment motions might well be granted
more often than under Steinman's interpretation-no other
interpretation seems practicable.
The next part of this Essay consists of a brief discussion of the
Celotex decision. I will then discuss Steinman's methodology for
interpreting judicial decisions, and, like Steinman, apply that
methodology to Celotex. But unlike Steinman (and apparently many
others), I will conclude that Celotex is essentially irrelevant insofar as
ascertaining the nature of the adverse party's burden at summary
judgment. I will then discuss what I believe is, or should be, the adverse
party's burden in this context, irrespective of Celotex, and will conclude
that Rule 56 is best interpreted as imposing a fairly strict evidentiary
standard with respect to materials presented in response to a motion for
summary judgment. I will also conclude, contrary to Steinman, that the
nature of those materials generally is limited to those items described in
Rule 56, and that there is very little relationship between an adverse
party's obligations in response to a motion for summary judgment and
in response to a request for discovery.'
II. THE CELOTEXDECISION
Celotex involved an action commenced by Mary Catrett on behalf of
her deceased husband who allegedly died as a result of exposure to
6. For the reader's reference, former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is reproduced
in Appendix A. Though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recently were "restyled" for
ease of readability, no change in meaning was intended. See Memorandum from Joseph
Kimble, Style Consultant, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules (Feb. 21, 2005) (on file with
author), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Prelimdraft-proposed-ptl.pdf. Whether
this is true with respect to Rule 56 is debatable. See Bradley Scott Shannon, Should Summary
Judgment Be Granted? (forthcoming). But even if the meaning of this rule has been changed,
those changes do not affect the analysis here, and the same is true of the other rules cited
herein. Thus, for ease of comparison with prior authorities, as well as with the many state
procedural rules that have been patterned after the federal rules, this Essay continues to use
the former language. Hereinafter, references to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the
main text will simply be referred to as "the Rules."
7. See Steinman, supra note 1, at 107-21 (discussing various interpretations of Celotex).
8. A summary of my conclusions in this area, juxtaposed to those of Steinman, can be
found in Appendix B.
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products containing asbestos manufactured or distributed by the fifteen
named corporate defendants.9 One of those defendants, Celotex Corp.,
moved for summary judgment on the ground that Catrett, in response to
a discovery request directed to this issue, failed to identify any witnesses
who could testify as to her husband's exposure to Celotex's products. °
In response to Celotex's motion, Catrett "produced" three documents: a
transcript of a deposition of the decedent from an earlier worker's
compensation proceeding; a letter from T.R. Hoff, a former supervisor
of the decedent, describing the products to which the decedent had been
exposed; and a letter from an insurer of a different defendant describing
the same." Catrett also then indicated her intent to call Hoff as a
witness at trial." In reply, Celotex "argued that the three documents
[produced by Catrett] were inadmissible hearsay and thus [should] not
be considered in opposition to [its] motion." 3
The district court granted Celotex's motion for summary judgment, 4
but a divided panel of the court of appeals reversed.'5 A majority of the
court of appeals, over a strong dissent by Judge Robert Bork, held that
Celotex's motion was rendered defective by the fact that it had "'made
no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise,
to support its motion.",' 16 As a result, the court of appeals "declined to
consider [Celotex's] argument that none of the evidence produced by
[Catrett] in opposition to the motion for summary judgment would have
been admissible at trial."' 7
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.'8
Rejecting the reasoning of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
held:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
9. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 319.
10. Id. at 319-20.
11. Id. at 320; id. at 335 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 320 (opinion of the Court).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 321.
16. Id. (quoting Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir.
1985)).
17. Id. at 322.
18. Id. at 319.
2008]
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showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 19
More specifically, the Court held that there is "no express or implied
requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with
affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim."2
Thus:
In cases like the instant one, where the nonmoving party
will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive
issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be
made in reliance solely on the "pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Such
a motion, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will
be "made and supported as provided in this rule," and
Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go
beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the
"depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.,
21
With respect to the nature of the adverse party's response to a
properly "made and supported" motion for summary judgment, the
Court continued:
We do not mean that the nonmoving party must
produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at
trial in order to avoid summary judgment. Obviously,
Rule 56 does not require the nonmoving party to depose
her own witnesses. Rule 56(e) permits a proper
summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the
kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except
the mere pleadings themselves, and it is from this list that
one would normally expect the nonmoving party to make
the showing to which we have referred.22
19. Id. at 322.
20. Id. at 323.
21. Id. at 324 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56).
22. Id.
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But the Court then reiterated that the court of appeals "declined to
address either the adequacy of the showing made by [Catrett] in
opposition to [Celotex's] motion for summary judgment, or the question
whether such a showing, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be
sufficient to carry [Catrett's] burden of proof at trial., 23  The Court
therefore remanded, having concluded that the court of appeals "with
its superior knowledge of local law is better suited than we are to make
these determinations in the first instance.
24
III. CELOTEX AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT BURDENS
What conclusions may we draw from Celotex regarding the parties'
respective burdens at summary judgment? To reach his interpretation
of Celotex, Steinman first articulates a methodology for interpreting
judicial decisions generally. Steinman posits that when seeking to
understand a decision, we should consider those "values that are
traditionally employed when interpreting a case: (1) consistency with
prior Supreme Court cases; (2) consistency with the governing textual
sources; and (3) coherence with other parts of the opinion and relevancy
given the case's factual and procedural posture."2  According to
Steinman, "[t]hese simple values are consistent with basic principles of
interpretation" and therefore "should not be controversial. 26
I agree that consistency with prior cases, consistency with governing
textual sources, and internal coherence are important interpretive
values. Nonetheless, there are aspects of Steinman's interpretive values
with which I respectfully disagree. For one thing, I disagree with their
order.27 In fact, I would like to reverse the order. (Actually, if it was up
to me, I would make the second value, "consistency with the governing
textual sources," the first value, for I cannot see how the Court, in the
23. Id. at 327.
24. Id. Incidentally, on remand, the court of appeals-again over a strong dissent by
Judge Bork-held that the materials submitted by Catrett showed a genuine issue of
material fact concerning the plaintiffs exposure to Celotex's products. See Catrett v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court of appeals reached its
decision largely on the ground that "Celotex never objected to the District Court's
consideration of the Hoff letter." Id. (emphasis omitted).
25. Steinman, supra note 1, at 122.
26. Id. at 107; see also id. at 107-09 (describing the bases for these values).
27. It might be more accurate to say that I disagree with the order in which they are
presented, for, to be fair, I cannot find any express indication that they have been presented
in any particular order. Of course, if they have not been presented in any particular order,
that also might be a basis for criticism, unless one believes that each of these values should be
given equal weight.
2008]
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course of one of its decisions, can change the meaning of a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure. I understand, though, that once the Court
interprets a governing textual source, it is that interpretation that
controls, regardless of how difficult it might be for others to square that
interpretation with the text so interpreted.29) Certainly, a case's
"internal coherence with other parts of the majority opinion and with
the case's factual and procedural posture"30 (the third value) is a more
important interpretive value than is consistency with prior cases (the
first value), for the Court may overrule itself,31 and need not even say
that it is doing so.3
Be that as it may, Steinman then proceeds to apply these interpretive
values to Celotex in an attempt to dispel a number of "myths
3
associated with that decision, and in doing so, he reaches several
conclusions purportedly deriving from that decision. For example,
Steinman disputes the notion (advanced by some) that a defending party
seeking summary judgment bears "essentially no burden at all.""
28. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) ("Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against
municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule
9(b). But that is a result which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal
Rules, and not by judicial interpretation."); cf Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167,
201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that because "the Constitution
does not change from year to year[,] ...it does not conform to our decisions, but our
decisions are supposed to conform to it").
29. See, e.g., Allan Ides, Judicial Supremacy and the Law of the Constitution, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 491, 500 (1999) ("[T]he judiciary possesses a recognized authority to interpret laws,
and the product of those interpretations is law ... even if the interpretation is somehow
deemed incorrect .... ). But see Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994) (arguing that, at least in constitutional cases, the practice
of following precedent is unconstitutional, at least where the decision in question is
inconsistent with the constitutional text being interpreted).
30. Steinman, supra note 1, at 107.
31. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("[T]he Court has during the
past 20 Terms overruled in whole or in part 33 of its previous constitutional decisions.").
32. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (recognizing the implicit
overruling of Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968), by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)); see also Shalala v. Ill.
Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000) ("This Court does not normally
overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio.") (emphasis added).
33. As my colleague, Professor Gerald Moran, astutely observed, the use of the term
"myth" here is intended to indicate that the interpretation in question is not based on the
written decision to which the interpretation is attributed, and thus that the interpretation is in
the nature of a myth. The reading of the decision itself, of course, is a fact, but the argument
is that the abstraction, the interpretation, is wholly unrelated thereto. In this sense, the
interpretation may be said to be a myth, or the source of a myth.
34. Steinman, supra note 1, at 109.
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Rather-and surely he is quite correct on this point-Steinman
concludes that a party (including a defending party) bears a
considerable burden in establishing that its motion for summary
judgment truly has been "made and supported"35 as provided in Rule
56(c)? 6
Yet, it is the application of these same interpretive values that leads
to a more serious disagreement I have with Professor Steinman's article:
his argument regarding the nature of the adverse party's burden in
response to a motion for summary judgment, particularly as it relates to
the plaintiff's response in Celotex. Steinman argues that the
misinterpretation of the last portion of the Court's opinion in Celotex-
that dealing with the nature of the adverse party's response-has led, in
part, to what he calls the "paper trial myth."3 According to this "myth,"
the adverse party's evidence "must meet a strict standard with respect to
admissibility-one that mirrors the rules for admissibility at trial."38
Steinman argues that this aspect of the paper trial myth "fails to
provide a sensible account of what the Celotex majority meant when it
said that a plaintiff does not have to use materials that are 'in a form
that would be admissible at trial."'39 Instead, Steinman argues that the
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
36. See Steinman, supra note 1, at 122-26.
37. Id. at 109-13. I say "in part" because there is another aspect of this myth: that
dealing with the nature of the moving party's burden. See supra notes 34-36 and
accompanying text (describing that aspect of the "paper trial myth"). But as indicated
previously, I agree with Steinman that "[a] defendant who seeks summary judgment on the
basis that the plaintiff will lack sufficient evidence to prove her case at trial must be able to
point to some Rule 56(c) document that would be expected to contain an identification or
description of evidence that the plaintiff could use at trial, but does not." See Steinman, supra
note 1, at 131-32.
38. Steinman, supra note 1, at 110. As Steinman explains it:
It is not enough for the plaintiff to identify witnesses she plans to call at
trial, even if the plaintiff indicates how she expects those witnesses to
testify. Likewise, it is not enough to present information via deposition
transcripts, interrogatory responses, or affidavits when the witness,
signatory, or affiant would not be competent to testify to such information
at trial. The plaintiff must provide . . . "trial-quality" evidence-sworn
statements, via affidavits, depositions, or interrogatory answers, by a
swearer with personal knowledge of the facts stated.
Id. at 110-11 (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 112 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). According to
Steinman:
The standard account that proponents of this view give is that the majority
was simply recognizing that affidavits may be considered for purposes of
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term "depose" "frequently refers not only to the taking of a deposition
as provided for in the federal rules, but also to the swearing of an
affidavit." ° Thus, according to Steinman, the Celotex Court's statement
that "Rule 56 does not require the nonmoving party to depose her own
witnesses 4 1 "may plausibly be read as rejecting the notion that a
plaintiff must obtain affidavits of her witnesses in order to avoid
summary judgment., 42 "Moreover," Steinman continues, "the view that
the majority intended only to carve out an [admissibility] exception for
affidavits cannot be reconciled with the factual posture of Celotex
itself.
4 3
In his attempt to formulate a more coherent interpretation of
Celotex, Steinman then asks two questions with respect to an adverse
party's response to summary judgment: (1) under what circumstances
may a court consider materials other than those described in Rule
56(c)? and (2) to what extent may a court consider materials that are not
in a form that would be admissible at trial?'
Regarding the first question, Steinman suggests that "[o]ne potential
answer is that some materials are the substantial equivalent of the
documents enumerated in Rule 56(c)," in that "the federal rules deem
information to be equivalent to a supplemental :answer to an
interrogatory if it is provided in a seasonable manner and with
summary judgment, even though affidavits (which by definition have not
been cross-examined) are not admissible at trial. They note that the very
next sentence in the opinion states that "Rule 56 does not require the
nonmoving party to depose her own witnesses," and they infer that Rule
56 does require the nonmoving party to obtain affidavits of her witnesses.
Id. at 112 (citations omitted) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
40. Id.
41. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
42. Steinman, supra note 1, at 112-13.
43. Id. at 113. As Steinman explains:
Catrett had not relied on affidavits in opposing Celotex's motion. Rather,
she presented copies of two letters (from the insurer and the assistant
secretary of Mr. Catrett's employer) and the decedent's own deposition
testimony from an earlier proceeding to which Celotex was not a party. If
affidavits are the only materials that courts may consider on summary
judgment despite being inadmissible at trial, the majority would have had
no need to remand the case. There certainly would have been no need to
remand the case out of deference to the D.C. Circuit's "superior
knowledge of local law."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327).
44. See id. at 127-31.
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substantial justification for the party's failure to provide the information
in its initial answer., 45  "When material containing such information
satisfies the federal rules in this way," Steinman continues, "it is
reasonable to treat that information as tantamount to 'answers to
interrogatories' for purposes of Rule 56(c) and, therefore, to consider
that information for purposes of a summary judgment motion.
' 6
The second question relates to the suggestion in Celotex that a court
may consider materials in response to a motion for summary judgment
even though they are not "in a form that would be admissible at trial.
47
Steinman begins by arguing that although Rule 56 sets forth a strict
standard with respect to affidavits,48 "Rule 56 imposes no general
standard of admissibility," in that it "does not impose this requirement
on the other categories of documents listed in Rule 56(c). 4 9 Steinman
further observes that if the information provided by Catrett in response
to Celotex's motion instead had been provided in response to Celotex's
original discovery request, Celotex (utilizing an "absence of evidence"
theory of summary judgment) would not have been able to satisfy its
initial burden under Rule 56(c)." Steinman then asks "whether the
result should be different simply because the plaintiff identified the
witness in a supplemental interrogatory answer."5 Steinman says no, for
"[i]n both situations, the information before the court is exactly the
same." 2 But Steinman quickly adds: "Obviously, the plaintiff's response
45. Id. at 127-28.
46. Id. at 128. Steinman then argues:
This reading of Rule 56(c) makes sense in light of the facts facing the
Court in Celotex. Among the materials Catrett presented in opposition to
Celotex's summary judgment motion were letters form Mr. Catrett's
employer's insurer and assistant secretary. These documents contained
information relating to the asbestos products Catrett's husband might
have handled while on the job. Thus they contained information that
could be deemed supplemental answers to Celotex's interrogatories,
which had asked Catrett to describe and identify evidence and witnesses
relating Mr. Catrett's exposure to any Celotex product.
Id. (citations omitted).
47. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (providing that affidavits "shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein").
49. Steinman, supra note 1, at 128.
50. Id. at 131.
51. Id.
52. Id. Thus, according to Steinman:
20081
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is sufficient only if her materials are 'reducible to admissible evidence.'
So materials that do not indicate that there will be evidentiary support
usable at trial would not suffice since they would not indicate a genuine
issue for trial.,
53
This is all a very interesting take on Celotex. But again, I disagree.
For one thing, to the extent Steinman is arguing that his view
regarding the nature of the adverse party's response is dictated by
Celotex, he seems to be disregarding his third interpretive value:
relevancy given the case's procedural posture." For as Steinman himself
recognized, the issue before the Celotex Court was confined strictly to
the sufficiency of the defendant's motion." As for the plaintiffs (i.e., the
adverse party's) burden, Steinman concedes that "the majority did not
decide whether Catrett had made a 'sufficient showing' in response to
Celotex's summary judgment motion. 56
It is true, as indicated previously, that the Supreme Court
To conclude that summary judgment should be granted in the first
instance but not in the second would create not only an intuitive
inconsistency but also a textual anomaly. We would be requiring courts to
conclude that the same materials are enough to create a "genuine issue"
in one situation but not in another. If Rule 56(c)'s standard is to have an
ascertainable meaning, it should at least yield consistent results when
applied to identical records.
Id.
53. Id. (citation omitted). Steinman offers the following hypothetical:
Suppose, for example, that Catrett had produced only Mr. Catrett's
deposition from his workers' compensation proceeding. The transcript
would not be admissible at trial because Celotex was not a party to the
earlier proceeding, and it could not be "reduced to admissible evidence"
because Mr. Catrett was deceased by that point in time. This hypothetical
showing would be insufficient not because such a deposition is
"inadmissible" for purposes of summary judgment, but because it fails to
show a "genuine issue" as to the material fact of exposure.
Id. (citation omitted).
54. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing Steinman's three "values" for
interpreting judicial decisions).
55. See Steinman, supra note 1, at 98 ("As for the specific issues presented in Celotex,
the majority rejected the D.C. Circuit's premise that Celotex had to present affirmative
evidence that Mr. Catrett had not been exposed to its asbestos products.").
56. Id. at 106-07. As Steinman explains: "The D.C. Circuit did not address that issue in
its initial opinion because it concluded that Celotex had not met its initial burden. Thus, the
Supreme Court remanded the case for the D.C. Circuit to determine whether Catrett had
made a sufficient showing of exposure to Celotex's products." Id. at 107 (citations omitted);
see also id. at 100 ("[O]ne cannot infer whether Catrett's showing was, in the Supreme Court's
view, sufficient to avoid summary judgment.").
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nonetheless spoke briefly as to the nature of the adverse party's
response.57 Why did the Court do so? One cannot say for sure, though
certainly the Court was aware that this issue would arise on remand."'
Regardless, there is no doubt that anything the Court might have said
with respect to the adverse party's burden was dicta, for it had nothing
to do with the Court's judgment. 9 As such, it is not binding upon the
parties in that case or anyone else, however persuasive or influential it
might appear.6 Such dicta, then, cannot provide substantial support for
anyone's view as to the nature of the adverse party's response to a
motion for summary judgment. Supreme Court decisions are not like
papal bulls; not everything the Court says matters.
For similar reasons, one cannot reasonably conclude, based on
Celotex, that a party responding to a motion for summary judgment
properly may submit materials, other than affidavits, that would not be
admissible at trial. Again, Steinman argues that if summary judgment
materials were so limited, there would have been no need to remand the
case.6 1  One difficulty with this argument, though, is that the Court
routinely refuses to decide issues that were not decided below.62 And in
Celotex, the Court expressly recognized that the court of appeals
"declined to address either the adequacy of the showing made by [the
plaintiff] in opposition to [the defendant's] motion for summary
judgment, or the question whether such a showing, if reduced to
admissible evidence, would be sufficient to carry [the plaintiff's] burden
of proof at trial." 63 Moreover, if the Supreme Court had decided these
issues, there would have been nothing for the court of appeals to do on
remand but further remand the case to the district court. Yet, the court
of appeals in fact discussed these issues at length, and ultimately decided
them primarily on a basis not even mentioned by the Supreme Court.64
57. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
58. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
59. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
1065 (2005) ("A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen decisional path or
paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and
(3) lead to the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.").
60. See id. at 957.
61. Steinman, supra note 1, at 113.
62. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470 (1999).
63. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
64. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding
inadmissible materials, such as the Hoff letter, may be considered in response to Celotex's
motion in the absence of a timely objection thereto). This rather mundane basis for the court
of appeals' decision on remand also might explain (at least in part) why the Supreme Court
20081
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So one is forced to conclude that Celotex really has nothing
definitive to say about an adverse party's response to a motion for
summary judgment.
IV. THE NATURE OF THE ADVERSE PARTY'S RESPONSE
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The fact that Celotex has nothing to say about the nature of the
adverse party's response to a motion for summary judgment does not
mean that everything Steinman writes on this subject is for naught.
Certainly, he is entitled to express his views as a prescriptive matter, at
least to the extent those views are consistent with Rule 56. The
question, now, though, becomes somewhat more normative: What
should be required of an adverse party in response to a motion for
summary judgment?
Again, using the materials presented by Catrett in response to
Celotex's motion as an example, Steinman argues that factual materials
presented in response to a motion for summary judgment need not be
limited to those items listed in Rule 56(c), and indeed need not even be
considered as a response per se, but rather may be considered an
amended response to a prior request for discovery.65 Steinman further
argues that, as with discovery responses generally, 66 such materials need
not be in a form that is admissible at trial, at least so long as they are
"reducible" to admissible evidence. 67
Here also, I must disagree. Regarding the type of materials that may
be considered in response to a motion for summary judgment, Rule
56(e) specifies "affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule"-
meaning "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions."'  No other materials are prescribed. 69 Given the clarity of
this language, one should be chary in presuming that any other materials
denied Celotex's second petition for writ of certiorari. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 484 U.S.
1066 (1988).
65. Steinman, supra note 1, at 127-28. Though Steinman uses the term "supplemental,"
rather than "amended," see, e.g., id. at 127, the former now appears to be limited to
corrections to required disclosures made pursuant to Rule 26(a), whereas the latter is used
with respect to corrections to other discovery responses. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e), 37(c)(1).
66. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Relevant information need not be admissible at the
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.").
67. See Steinman, supra note 1, at 131.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
69. But see 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2000) (providing generally for the use of declarations in
lieu of affidavits in federal proceedings).
[91:815
20081 RESPONDING TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
may be presented.
This is not to say, of course, that documents other than those
described in Rule 56 (such as letters) may not be presented at summary
judgment; they may, though typically only through an affidavit, just as
exhibits at trial typically are admitted through witnesses." Indeed, Rule
56(e) expressly provides that "[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or
served therewith."71 Though some (like Catrett) might try to avoid this
rule by failing to refer to such papers in their affidavits (or by failing to
present affidavits at all), it seems unlikely that this requirement may be
circumvented in this fashion; the negative implication here is simply too
strong. 2 And if this reading of Rule 56 is correct, what need is there for
exceptions? Virtually anything a party might want to present already
has been included.
Steinman rests his argument that a court properly could consider
bald, unauthenticated documents at summary judgment in part on the
Celotex Court's statement that "Rule 56 does not require the nonmoving
70. As one leading treatise explains:
Documentary and other substantive evidence-whether obtained in
disclosure and discovery or outside those processes-may be presented to
support or oppose a summary judgment motion when the evidence is
properly authenticated and constitutes admissible evidence.
Unauthenticated documents, once challenged, cannot be considered by a
court in determining a summary judgment motion. In order to
authenticate materials not yet part of the court record so that they may be
considered on summary judgment, the party generally must meet a two-
prong test: (1) the materials must be attached to and authenticated by an
affidavit or declaration that complies with Rule 56(e)(1); and (2) the
affiant or declarant must be a competent witness through whom the
materials could be received into evidence at trial.
11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.14[2][c], at 56-218 (3d ed.
2007) (citations omitted); accord id. § 56.10[4][c][i][3], at 56-70 ("Unless [an] extra-record
document is self-authenticating and intrinsically trustworthy on its face (a rare situation), this
type of document must be introduced by affidavit to ensure its consideration by the court.");
10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2722,
at 382-84 (3d ed. 1998) ("To be admissible, documents must be authenticated by and attached
to an affidavit that meets the requirements of Rule 56(e) and the affiant must be a person
through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence.") (footnotes omitted); id. at 379
("Exhibits that have been properly made a part of an affidavit also may be considered.").
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added).
72. It also might be observed that although documents may be attached to pleadings, see
FED. R. Civ. P. 10(c), reliance by the adverse party upon its pleading alone is insufficient. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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party to depose her own witnesses." 73  According to Steinman, this
statement "may plausibly be read as rejecting the notion that a plaintiff
must obtain affidavits of her witnesses in order to avoid summary
judgment., 74 But this interpretation does not strike me as plausible (or
at least it seems far less plausible than the "standard account" that
generally requires evidence to be proffered through a testifying
witness).75 For when the Court used the word "depose," it surely meant
"[t]o examine a witness in a deposition. ' 76 Coupled with more general
concerns about admissibility,7  any other meaning seems quite
implausible. At a minimum, any other meaning of this word would have
to be regarded as unintentional. Conversely, if Steinman is correct-i.e.,
if the Court indeed intended that "depose" include affidavits-then this
language must be regarded as ill-considered, if for no other reason than
that it seems to be contrary to the text of Rule 56.8
But even if materials other than those described in Rule 56 properly
may be considered, a more serious problem arises with respect to
Steinman's argument that the materials presented by a responding party
might be regarded as an amended or supplemental discovery response
or disclosure. The problem is that once a motion for summary judgment
is properly made, responses to discovery requests become largely
irrelevant. (I say largely because, as Steinman points out,79 the adverse
party also might well have to explain why those materials were not
disclosed previously.') Rather, what the adverse party must now do is
73. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
74. Steinman, supra note 1, at 112-13.
75. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) (requiring an
adverse party needing additional time to respond to a motion for summary judgment to state,
by affidavit, the reasons it cannot "present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition") (emphasis added).
76. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 471 (8th ed. 2004) (parentheses omitted).
77. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text (discussing the evidentiary standard to
be applied at summary judgment to a party's factual materials).
78. This is but one reason why dictum is not considered binding. See Bradley Scott
Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 811, 849 (2003).
Incidentally, a similar explanation may be given with respect to the Court's statement
that "it is from this list"-i.e., "the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c)"-"that
one would normally expect the nonmoving party to make the showing to which we have
referred." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Though some (like Steinman) might be tempted to cite
this statement in support of the proposition that non-Rule 56(c) materials properly may be
considered in this context, it seems more likely that the Court was simply exercising caution,
this precise issue having not yet been raised.
79. Steinman, supra note 1, at 127-28.
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1), which provides:
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respond to the motion-that is, it must "set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial."'" Discovery is not an end in itself;
it is, instead, but a means to an end, the end being the resolution of the
underlying dispute, whether by trial or, if appropriate, summary
judgment. When compelled to make one's case (or to respond to the
opposing party's case), what matters are facts, not responses to
discovery. Though one might have a duty to amend or supplement
one's discovery responses or disclosures,82 this alone is not an adequate
response in the summary judgment context.
This distinction between a response to a discovery request and to a
motion for summary judgment is demonstrated by Rule 56 itself. Under
Rule 56(f), a party opposing a motion for summary judgment, upon a
showing of good cause, may be given additional time to conduct
additional discovery-though not for the purpose of revising some
earlier discovery response, but rather for the purpose of "present[ing]
by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition." This
distinction also supplies the answer to Steinman's question as to why
providing the name of a witness in discovery should be treated
differently from a similar response to a motion for summary judgment.83
Though providing the name of a potential witness in discovery might
well compel an adverse party contemplating a motion for summary
judgment to depose that witness, such a response is inadequate once the
A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information
required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to
discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is
harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a
motion any witness or information not so disclosed.
(emphasis added).
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); cf Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990)
("[T]he purpose of Rule 56 is to enable a party who believes there is no genuine dispute as to
a specific fact essential to the other side's case to demand at least one sworn averment of that
fact before the lengthy process of litigation continues."). Incidentally, though later cases
might not be of aid to the interpretation of prior ones, they can be helpful in ascertaining the
current state of the law-understanding that with respect to summary judgment, the Supreme
Court could do a lot more in this regard.
82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e) (providing that a party has a duty to amend or supplement
a prior discovery response or disclosure "if ordered by the court" or if the party learns that
"in some material respect" the response or disclosure is "incomplete or incorrect and if the
additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties
during the discovery process or in writing"). Of course, even if material, a party need not do
anything if the corrective information has "otherwise been made known to the other parties
during the discovery process or in writing." Id.
83. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
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motion has been filed, just as a witness list (as opposed to witness
testimony) is inadequate at trial. The "records" in these two situations,
therefore, are far from "identical."84 Indeed, giving such a response this
sort of retroactive effect would be subversive to the entire summary
judgment process.
Steinman attempts to temper his approval of a Catrett-type response
by arguing that, in the summary judgment context, such a response "is
sufficient only if [the adverse party's] materials are 'reducible to
admissible evidence."'' 5 But there are problems with this argument as
well. For one thing, the reference by the Supreme Court to materials
"reduced to admissible evidence"86 -which related to questions that
continued to surround Catrett's materials in Celotex-clearly referred
only to the "adequacy of the showing made by [Catrett] in opposition to
[Celotex's] motion for summary judgment."87  In other words, this
phrase related to whether Catrett's materials even could be considered
in this context-i.e., whether they were of the type permitted under Rule
56.88
More significantly, mere reducibility to admissible evidence is not
the proper standard for assessing the adequacy of the materials
presented by the adverse party at summary judgment. Rather, the
adverse party must present materials that are themselves admissible.89
And this statement regarding the nature of the adverse party's materials
is true regardless of the form such materials might take-i.e., regardless
of which materials identified in Rule 56(c) are utilized.' Admittedly,
84. Steinman, supra note 1, at 131.
85. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)).
86. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
89. See EDWARD BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL
LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:6, at 220 (3d ed. 2006) ("It is clear that the evidence submitted by
the parties to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment must be admissible under
the Federal Rules of Evidence."); MOORE ET AL., supra note 70, § 56.13[4], at 56-180
(concluding that Rule 56(e) requires a showing of "competent summary judgment evidence in
the record that can be produced at trial and qualify as substantial evidence").
90. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 70, § 2722, at 371-72 ("Only that portion of a
deposition that would be admissible in evidence at trial may be introduced on a summary-
judgment motion .... "); id. at 374 (recognizing the use of interrogatory answers in
connection with a motion for summary judgment "as long as they satisfy the other
requirements in Rule 56 and contain admissible material"). Actually, this appears to be true
as well with respect to those materials not identified in Rule 56(c), to the extent such
materials properly may be presented. See id. at 361 ("The court may consider any material
that would be admissible or usable at trial.").
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Rule 56(e) permits a party to present affidavits in connection with a
motion for summary judgment, and as Steinman observes, affidavits
themselves generally are not admissible at trial.9 ' But Rule 56(e) does
require that the contents of the affidavit consist of admissible evidence, 9
and it makes little sense to impose this requirement on affidavits and not
on anything else that might be presented in response.93 It also makes
little sense to permit a party to avoid summary judgment-the purpose
of which is to avoid a needless trial94-with materials that would not be
admissible at trial. How may one determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial other than by the consideration of that evidence that
would be admissible at trial?95 An exception (as to form) has been
91. Steinman, supra note 1, at 112.
92. See also MOORE, supra note 70, § 56.14[1][d], at 56-192 to 56-193 (concluding that
summary judgment affidavits "must consist of admissible evidence in order properly to be
considered in connection with the motion"); id. at 56-193 ("To be acceptable at [the]
summary judgment stage, the evidence presented in the affidavit must be evidence that would
be admissible if presented at trial through the testimony of the affiant as a sworn witness.");
10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2738,
at 330 (3d ed. 1998) (similarly concluding that "the first requisite [of affidavits presented in
connection with a motion for summary judgment] is that the information they contain (as
opposed to the affidavits themselves) would be admissible at trial"); id. at 330-33 ("[E]x parte
affidavits, which are not admissible at trial, are appropriate on a summary-judgment hearing
to the extent they contain admissible information.").
93. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 89, § 8:6, at 222-23 ("It would seem illogical to
single out affidavits that are clearly contemplated for use by Rule 56(e) for testing under the
rules of evidence, yet simultaneously not require that items of proof that are not embraced by
Rule 56(e) meet the requirements of the rules of evidence."); see also MOORE, supra note 70,
§ 56.14[2][b], at 56-216 ("Interrogatories used in connection with a summary judgment
motion are bound by the same rules of admissibility as affidavits."). Certainly, the other
items described in Rule 56(c)-pleadings (at least to the extent the claimant's allegations
have been admitted), depositions (which are taken under oath, see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P.
30(c)), answers to interrogatories (which are also made under oath, see FED. R. CIv. P.
33(b)(1)), and admissions-are (or might be) admissible at trial without further foundation.
Conspicuously absent from this list, though, are documents (such as might be obtained in
connection with a formal request for production of documents). But as discussed previously,
see supra note 70 and accompanying text, this does not mean that documents may not be
presented in connection with a motion for summary judgment; they may, though typically
only through a testifying witness, just as they would be proffered at trial.
94. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
95. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 89, § 8:6, at 223 ("Rule 56 is designed to avoid a
trial that would be unnecessary. The motion could not serve that function if, in deciding
whether issues exist for trial, courts were to consider evidence that could not subsequently be
admitted at trial."); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)
("[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party
for a jury to return a verdict for that party."); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) ("When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule
56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts.") (footnote omitted). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d) ("Case Not Fully
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [91:815
created for affidavits so as to permit a party to present non-deposition
testimony on paper.' There are no other exceptions.
And even aside from its incongruity with governing textual sources,
there is a more practical problem with Steinman's approach. One might
know with some certainty what will not be admissible at trial; an
example might be the deposition transcript from Catrett's worker's
compensation proceeding.7 What will ultimately be admissible, though
also knowable with some certainty, is somewhat harder to predict, for
one cannot know for sure whether any particular item of evidence will
be admitted at trial until it is proffered. Even relevant evidence may be
excluded if deemed cumulative or unfairly prejudicial,98 and some
evidence may be admissible if proffered by one party, but not the
other.' But admissibility at trial is a much more certain standard than
that proposed by Steinman: reducibility to admissible evidence. For
example, Steinman apparently believes that a court may consider
unauthenticated documents at summary judgment, so long as those
documents are accompanied by the name of a witness who the
presenting party "thinks" will eventually be able to provide a sufficient
Adjudicated on Motion"), which provides:
If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole
case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before
it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material
facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are
actually and in good faith controverted .... Upon the trial of the action
the facts [determined to be without substantial controversy] shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(emphasis added).
96. It is well-established that summary judgment "mainly involves a paper process rather
than the live presentation of proof." BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 89, § 8:1, at 207. In part
this is because "[t]he summary judgment process provides a method to conserve judicial
resources." Id. § 8:4, at 212. "Moreover, since witness credibility is generally not a relevant
factor to the rendering of decision on a summary judgment motion, little is likely to be gained
by the use of live testimony, rather than affidavits." Id. at 213; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 43(e)
("When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on
affidavits presented by the respective parties. ... ); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.11 (1983) ("The primary difference between ... motions [for
summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law] is procedural; summary judgment
motions are usually made before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while [motions
for judgment as a matter of law] are made at trial and decided on the evidence that has been
admitted.").
97. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
98. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
99. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(5) (regarding recorded recollections).
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evidentiary foundation therefor."° But how does one know whether that
witness will appear at trial? How that witness will testify? Though
some of these same problems accompany affidavits, the level of
speculation here seems unacceptably high."°
Of course, as Celotex itself demonstrates, any objection to materials
presented in connection with a motion for summary judgment, whether
within or without the scope of Rule 56, will be waived if not made in a
timely manner.I°2 Again, what is true at trial is generally true here
also,"' and in this limited sense Steinman might be correct. But that
which may be considered absent a timely objection should be
distinguished from that which is proper in the first instance.
1
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V. CONCLUSION
Professor Steinman's article is an impressive piece. Indeed, because
Professor Steinman's article makes so substantial a contribution to the
law of summary judgment, I am loath to criticize. But his views
regarding the nature of the adverse party's response should be a cause
100. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
101. See also BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 89, § 8:6, at 228-29 (discussing the
problems associated with such "will-call" witnesses).
102. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 37-38 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
on remand from Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); see also FED. R. EVID.
103(a)(1) (providing that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits ...
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected" and "a timely objection or motion
to strike appears of record"); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 70, § 2722, at 384-85 ("As is true of
other material introduced on a summary-judgment motion, uncertified or otherwise
inadmissible documents may be considered by the court if not challenged. The objection
must be timely or it will be deemed to have been waived.") (footnotes omitted).
103. Cf. BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 89, § 8:1, at 206 ("Although the functions served
by summary judgment and trial are of course different, the procedures used in assessing
summary judgment so closely approximate a trial that in a certain sense the Rule 56 process
might be appropriately described as a type of 'mini-trial' or a 'trial by paper."')
104. While on this subject, just a brief note on what it means for something to be "in the
record," a subject of considerable debate in Celotex. Whatever this phrase might mean, it
surely cannot mean simply that something has been presented to a court, for there is little
preventing a party from presenting virtually anything, at least as an initial matter. Cf FED. R.
CIv. P. 5(e) ("The clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that
purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form as required by these rules or any
local rules or practices."). Rather, it seems that something may only be regarded as "in the
record" if it has been proffered and admitted (implicitly if not explicitly) by that court with
respect to the resolution of some issue in that case-and even then, that which is "in the
record" for one purpose might not be "in the record" for all subsequent purposes, regardless
of their nature. The bottom line is that the mere presentation of materials to a court does not
mean that those materials are "in the record" (other than as a docketing matter) or that the
court must or even may consider that item in any later proceeding.
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for concern among those who favor the use of this procedure. For
Steinman's arguments notwithstanding, this aspect of the "paper trial
myth"1 5 is, in fact, no myth, or at least it is not nearly as mythical as
Steinman might believe.
When a motion for summary judgment is properly "made and
supported," the adverse party must respond with "specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial."'1 Those facts generally must be
of the type described in Rule 56(c), and must consist of admissible
evidence. This is the best reading of Rule 56, and no Supreme Court
holding (including Celotex) is to the contrary. This view of summary
judgment also makes normative sense and is consistent with what better
lawyers in fact do. Does this mean that some parties, unable to meet
this standard, will lose their "right" to a trial? Perhaps, though I would
posit that most of the concerns along these lines can be dealt with
through a judicious use of the procedure described in Rule 56(f). But
this result-the elimination of needless trials-is precisely what Rule 56
was designed to accomplish.' °7 If that is "unfair," then the abolition of
this procedure would seem to be the better solution.'9
Of course, it might be that my take on Celotex and the law of
summary judgment, not Steinman's, is incorrect. Or the truth might lie
somewhere in between. Regardless, my hope is that, through dissent,
the truth might someday be revealed.' 9  And perhaps, as Rule 56
evolves-and it wil111-that truth might be made more manifest.
105. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
107. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). This assumes, though, that
summary judgment is itself constitutional. Arguably, it is not. See Suja A. Thomas, Why
Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007).
108. Some, it might be observed, have advocated precisely that. See, e.g., John
Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 (2007).
109. On the value of dissent generally, see Arthur J. Jacobson, Publishing Dissent, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1607 (2005).
110. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules currently is considering substantial
amendments to Rule 56. See Memorandum from the Honorable Mark R. Kravitz, Chair,
Advisory Comm. on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal,
Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Dec. 17, 2007), available at
www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV12-2007.pdf. Though the precise form of any such
amendments is still somewhat unclear, it appears likely that proposed amendments to Rule 56
will be formally published for public comment sometime during 2008.
[91:815
RESPONDING TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
APPENDIX A
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56**
Rule 56. Summary Judgment
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at
any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the
action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for
a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served
at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount
of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under
this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the
motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts
exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are
actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is
not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
** The version of Rule 56 reproduced here is the version that was in effect immediately
prior to the effective date of the restyle amendments, December 1, 2007. See Supreme Court
Order, April 30, 2007. To the extent current Rule 56 is deemed inapplicable, this version
presumably would control. See id. (providing that the restyle amendments "shall govern in all
proceedings thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then
pending").
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as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or
opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose
of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to
pay the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the
filing of the affidavits caused the other party to incur, including
reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be
adjudged guilty of contempt.
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APPENDIX B
RESPONDING TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT: TWO VIEWS
ASPECT STEINMAN SHANNON
Nature of adverse Essentially anything Generally limited to
party's factual materials described
materials in Rule 56
Relationship between Such materials may Possible discovery
adverse party's be regarded as an sanctions aside, no
factual materials and amended or relationship
rules governing supplemental
discovery discovery response or
disclosure
Admissibility of Need only be Generally must be
adverse party's reducible to admissible, as if at
factual materials admissible evidence trial
at trial
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